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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
The spectacle of hundreds of enraged, smart-suited professionals furiously banging pots 
and pans outside Argentinas Central Bank in a cacerolazo protest against the 
confiscation of their dollar bank deposits during December 2001 was all too alluring for 
the international mass media. But since the corralito and the Argentine Governments 
default on its $95 billion debt (Lopez Levy 2004:11) the plight of the countrys nuevos 
pobres has disappeared from their attention. Even within academia, the pauperisation of 
millions of its middle-class is an issue barely touched upon in the early twenty-first 
century. This research deficiency is attributable to several causes. First, within Latin 
America itself the issue of new poverty is barely discussed because of the fact that the 
middle-class is comparatively much smaller than in Europe and North America so their 
impoverishment is less politically significant. Second, the structural poverty enveloping 
the continent has become a far more relevant topic for intellectual analysis. Meanwhile 
for scholars of the worlds richer nations, the idea of downward social mobility is no 
longer novel or worthy of investigation. In any case, for geopolitical reasons they have 
focussed much more on the evolution of the new poverty that emerged during the early 
1990s in the former Soviet Union (Kessler/Di Virgilio 2006).  
 
 
 
We of the sinking middle class may sink without further struggles into the working class 
where we belong, and probably when we get there it will not be as dreadful as we feared, 
for after all, we have nothing to lose. 
 
George Orwell  
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But this paper does not simply try to trace the fate beset upon the newly and abruptly 
impoverished victims of the 2000/2 economic crisis since the corralito. It also presents 
a sociological analysis of those new poor who experienced subtler pauperisation as part 
of the gradual decline in living standards which, as first acknowledged by Minujín, 
Beccaria and Bustelo in Cuesta Abajo in 1993, emanated from the stabilisation and 
structural adjustment policies that commenced three decades ago (Minujín 1995:153).  
 
In recent years, academic literature in this area has concentrated on a debate about 
whether one can speak of the disappearance of the middle-class. Svampa develops 
Mafuds prediction (1985:17) from twenty years ago that the development of neo-
liberalism has polarised its losers in the lower-middle class (who experience 
proletarianisation) and winners (who enjoy 'oligarchisation' by integrating into the 
upper-class). She argues that the cultural homogeneity of the middle-class has thus been 
irrevocably extinguished (2000). In La Clase Media, Seducida y Abandonada, Minujín 
disagrees with this prognosis of dualism, and while recognising that the middle-class 
has fractured, he proposed that the new poor retain certain aspects of social and cultural 
capital that ensure they remain integrated rather than marginalised (2004:20). More 
recently, Kessler has produced some intriguing work on both self-identification of the 
new poor and what patterns have emerged with respect to their social mobility (2006). 
Since Fiszbein et. al. meticulously dissected the World Bank's (2003) household survey 
to scrutinize how the new poor have adopted coping strategies in Argentina since the 
crisis, no further attempts have been made to research how these trends have changed. 
A revised and truncated effort (albeit illustrative not exhaustive) is made here. 
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Unlike most previous studies in this field, this paper aims to contribute to a niche in 
academic research by investigating what has happened to Argentinas new poor who 
have not recovered their previous socio-economic status since the corralito but have 
had to adapt to long-term downward social mobility? Chapter 1 provides an overview 
of the significance of new poverty and poses whether the subjects of our study can 
still legitimately be described as new poor a quarter of a century after their initial 
social descent. By observing changes in different asset capitals they posses (financial, 
human, physical, social and natural) that distinguish new from structural poverty, it 
establishes an analytical basis for ascertaining why they have remained poor, what their 
prospects are for recovery and what can be done to help them. Such an approach that 
dissects new poverty in this way has not been undertaken before. Chapter 2 focuses on 
the labour market, observing downward pressures on mobility that help to explain why 
such a considerable proportion of the new poor have not, and are not likely to see their 
situation improve in future. Chapter 3 reveals some of the psychological and social 
consequences of having moved from despair to resignation and adapting to 
downward mobility since 2000/01, as suggested by the title of this article. Finally in 
the concluding chapter, it seeks to aid further research by drawing on evidence from 
earlier chapters to understand the problems those affected by new poverty face, while 
proposing alternatives for how the phenomenon may be confronted through the use of 
social and micro-economic policy. 
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METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 
Field research was conducted over a period of two months in Buenos Aires and 
interviews usually took place in respondents homes, where those who classify as 
nuevos pobres (even if they do not regard themselves as such) felt most comfortable. 
Respondents were questioned not only about changes in their attitudes and lifestyles 
pertaining to their asset capitals, but were also asked to make self-assessments about 
their current socio-economic situations and how they believe they will change in the 
future. I already knew many of those interviewed, as clients of the JDC,1 an NGO, for 
whom I had performed voluntary work during the economic crisis. I had hoped that this 
relationship might help illicit more honest responses from interviewees, who I believe 
saw me as someone empathetic to their plight. However, one cannot rule out the 
possibility that they may have been prone to exaggerate their circumstances, or 
paradoxically, even to have underplayed their conditions for fear of humiliation, a 
common sentiment in light of their rapid decline in personal fortune. In addition, it must 
be stressed that these interviews are used to illustrate certain points and do not represent 
the entire spectrum of new poor. Where I argue a case using a quote from a 
respondent, they are usually substantiated by statistics from CEPAL, SITEAL or other 
reliable source, or verified by experts whom I approached. Most of my secondary 
evidence was acquired from sources obtained from FLACSO, UBA, or newspaper and 
other online archives. 
                                                
1 www.jdc.org.uk  
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CHAPTER 1  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The emergence of the nuevos pobres 
 
From the mid-twentieth century, throughout most of Latin America, the middle sectors 
flourished both numerically and in their living standards under the predominant ISI 
economic model. In Argentina, this was promoted by General Juan Peron under whose 
command, domestic industry was protected, higher levels of education were encouraged 
and a welfare state was created - offering job security, social protection and access to 
goods and services, while improving opportunities for upward social mobility. 
However, since then, these favourable conditions have been slowly stripped away as the 
middle-class has endured three waves of impoverishment (Kessler/Di Virgilio 2006). 
The first wave began when the military government of 1976-83 enforced a salary freeze 
upon middle-income earners in an attempt to control inflation. The second wave was 
the most prolonged and gradual - a consequence not only of the hyperinflation of the 
late 1980s which wiped out savings and caused serious repercussions for small 
businesses, (Martinez 2003) but more significantly, the squeezing of the lower-middle 
class during the 1990s. As Argentina embraced the free-market under structural 
adjustment policies carried out during Carlos Menems presidency, thousands of small 
enterprises folded as they lost subsidies and failed to contend with the concentration of 
industry and influx of powerful foreign competition from multinationals (Liendo 
2001:19). Labour also became relatively less productive and more expensive due to 
technological innovation, so was substituted with capital (Mejía 2006). Public sector 
shrinking demanded by the IMF to confront the debt crisis, prompted redundancies for 
150,000 civil servants with many more incurring a significant deterioration in salaries 
First the weakest were excluded, then followed the less weak. Finally the middle-class 
was condemned to the same fate. 
 
        Bertold Brecht, 1898-1956 
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and conditions (Lvovich in Svampa ed. 2000:56). Furthermore, in Argentina the 
imposition of neo-liberalism and the materialism and individualism it spawned, placed 
citizens, especially the middle-class, under immense pressure to conform to 
conspicuous consumption guidelines under which they were encouraged to purchase 
cheaply imported luxury good and services which were paid for with credit, which itself 
led to long-term indebtedness (Liendo 2001:30).   
 
Working conditions for many white-collar workers also worsened as they sank much 
faster than the structural poor. Often, they did not enjoy the same degree of trade 
union protection or benefit as much from social rights, so were more exposed in times 
of economic recession (Mafud 1985:160). While average real household income for the 
poorest quintile of society fell by 25% during these two decades, for the middle 
quintiles it was nearer 33% (Minujín 1995:161-162).  
 
Finally the most recent wave was the economic crisis of six years ago. For many of 
the middle-class, it entailed not only the sudden loss of savings in the corralito, but 
hundreds of thousands more lost businesses or jobs. Internal investment fell by a 
quarter as GDP receded by 20.1% between October 1998 and March 2001 (Beccaria 
2005:236-237). The end of the pegging of the peso to the dollar under convertibilidad 
also made many the imported goods and services they were accustomed to purchasing, 
suddenly become incredibly expensive, meaning they even many of those who retained 
their jobs, had to forfeit such extravagant lifestyles. In 1980, just 3.1% of the 
population were blighted by new poverty (those who were not poor previously but 
had become so), whereas by 2002 it amounted to 35.8%. To put the crisis into 
perspective, according to leading Argentine economist Bernardo Kliksberg, some seven 
million middle-class people became impoverished in its aftermath (Naishtat 2006). 
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Defining the New Poor  Economists vs Sociologists 
In 2002, in several shantytowns on the outskirts of Buenos Aires, posters appeared 
saying welcome middle-class! (Abadi/Mileo 2002:20) however, in reality, only a 
negligible number fell so profoundly that they ended up living in such pockets of 
temporary settlements. Generally, the new poor continued to reside in apartment 
buildings in metropolitan, middle-class districts despite the fact that from an income 
and consumption perspective, (often used by economists as indicators of poverty), they 
were in the same situation as an obrero shantytown dweller who only had a tin roof 
separating them from the elements. New poverty therefore takes place behind closed 
doors and is hidden (Kliksberg 2000:105). The experience of pauperisation for 
millions during the last three decades highlighted that poverty in Argentina was no 
longer a homogenous concept but had become far more complex.2 New poverty 
differs from structural poverty because the former is the result of a recent process 
(retreat of the state, labour market changes etc) not a longer-term social position (Iriarte 
2003). Recognising this, Minujín, Beccaria and Bustelo explain that although their 
income and consumption levels had fallen drastically, plunging them into 
impoverishment according to the poverty-line approach, unlike the structural poor, 
they retained adequate housing, access to health and education services and had 
drinking water, gas and electricity needs etc fulfilled. Hence, in the Argentine case, one 
had to combine both poverty-line and basic needs approaches to redefine the 
                                                
2 In this article I avoid describing the new poor as fallen middle-class unless cited authors do so 
specifically. Firstly, because approximately a quarter were actually non-poor working-class before 
becoming newly impoverished (Lvovich in Svampa ed. 2000:52) and secondly because the notion of 
belonging to the middle-class is rather spurious, for reasons explained later. A more accurate way to 
encapsulate the origins of at least three-quarters of those described as new poor, is to adopt Svampas 
terminology  the services class. Taken from Goldthorpe and Austro-Marxist - Renner in the 1980s, it 
describes workers in non-productive employment, who unlike the working-class are engaged in a 
different quality of work, whereby they exercise greater authority or autonomy because they are the 
skilled holders of privileged information e.g. self-employed, experts or professionals located in the 
services sector (Svampa 2000).  
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composition of this new poverty in sociological, not purely economic terms (Minujín 
1995:159).  
 
Diagram 1 (see appendix) illustrates this and how the nature of poverty has changed in 
Argentina. It shows how new poverty has become much more prevalent since 2002, as 
indicated by the expansion of Area C. Meanwhile, the structural poor are described as 
those who are impoverished in terms of basic needs and income (Areas A and B). In 
Area A, a small minority of structural poor live above the poverty-line in terms of 
income, yet have their basic needs unsatisfied (Minujín 1995:159-160). 
 
 
Unlike the structural poor, nuevos pobres also benefit from possessing certain capital 
assets that help them escape poverty. In terms of their social capital, their 
connectedness through kinship ties or networks of business acquaintances or friends 
with valuable social status, can help expand their access to other institutions, 
employment possibilities, or material needs. With respect to human capital, they are 
likely to possess much higher levels of education and a greater diversity of work 
experience and skills, including leadership potential. They are also likely to be 
healthier, having been able to afford better quality food and having had access to 
superior healthcare in the past. Part of this investigation will strive to determine the 
extent to which since the corralito, the current new poor have managed to retain this 
Characteristics of new poverty 
• Heterogeneity in employment profile 
• Unemployment/underemployment 
• Significant changes in consumption patterns from before 
• Invisibility 
• Appearance or aggravation of health problems 
• Deterioration of family and personal relations 
• Difficulties in social integration 
   Source: La Lucha Contra la Pobreza en América Latina, Kliksberg 2000:105 
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social capital and connectedness. Have they suffered human capital losses from being 
de-skilled and dis-educated, or endured poorer health and thus been brought closer to 
the structural poor in these respects? This article assumes that by definition of 
remaining new poor, their financial capital (savings, liquid assets, credit) lost during 
the crisis has not yet been replenished, but I shall test this anyway. Natural (resource-
based) capital for both new and structural poor living in urban areas will be negligible. 
Finally in terms of physical capital, I will investigate whether access to affordable 
transport, secure shelter, adequate water supply and sanitation, clean, affordable energy 
and information have decreased or been recuperated by the new poor since 2001. 
Certainly, nuevos pobres enjoy higher basic needs fulfilment (as mentioned), but has 
their previously superior ability to obtain physical capital in the form of private health 
care, education or home security been permanently restricted?  
 
Obviously one cannot be precise when measuring how these asset capital levels have 
changed, due to the impossibility of aggregating the exact amount each household 
possesses, but these findings will be illustrative and based on interviewees responses 
and other evidence compiled during research. Adapting DFIDs use of the asset 
pentagon can help observe these changes (1999). The shape of the pentagon can be 
used to show schematically the variation in peoples access to such assets (See Diagram 
2 in appendix which illustrates how asset levels changed on the pentagon pre and 
immediately post-corralito). Where the lines meet at the centre of the pentagon, this 
represents zero access to assets, while the outer perimeter represents maximum access. 
On this basis, different shaped pentagons can be drawn to also represent what may 
happen to the new poor in the future. Comparisons can also be made with pentagons for 
the structural poor. Thus conclusions will be established about whether in terms of asset 
capitals, the new poor are moving increasingly closer to structural poverty or not.  
 15
Exhaustion of a Model: Are the New Poor Still New? 
 
The crisis of 2001 clearly produced a new wave of impoverishment, but in a much 
more violent fashion than the subtle, gradual pauperisation of previous decades. 
However, by then it was no longer a new social phenomenon in Argentina (Kessler/Di 
Virgilio 2006). To describe this tendency as new poverty in the 1990s was useful 
because there was a need to distinguish it from traditional impoverishment. It also 
helped reduce the social stigma of being poor. But someone who became 
impoverished in the late 1970s or 1990s waves (or even during the crisis of six years 
ago, and has remained in that situation today), cannot legitimately still be described as 
new poor. Yet due to the differences in cultural, human and social capital they possess 
compared to the structural poor mentioned earlier, some distinct way of classifying 
them (without using the term new) must be found. One of the pioneering theorists of 
new poverty, Gabriel Kessler suggests that an alternative approach is to view their 
predicament as closer to that of todays European new poor, thats to say a services 
class that has suffered economic decline during the last thirty years and for whom 
impoverishment is accompanied by indebtedness and the inability to meet expenses 
(2007). While a useful likeness, the Argentine new poor are not European, and despite 
similar structural economic transformations there, the Latin American variety have 
been the victims of a distinct set of policies. Using this background and evidence from 
my research findings, a more sophisticated approach to overcoming this terminological 
deficiency will be explored.  
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The New Poor 2001 - 2007  A Synopsis 
Approximately 10% of the population, or four million Argentines can be described 
today as new poor in the sense that they are living below or very close to the poverty 
line, yet were not historically poor (Curotto Prensa Digital 2006).  What has become 
clear from a recent study3 is that approximately 40% of Argentinas nuevos pobres have 
recovered the equivalent jobs and consumption patterns that they enjoyed before the 
2001 devaluation. Meanwhile, the rest look likely to face the prospect of remaining 
poor, despite the strong macroeconomic recovery that Argentina has benefited from 
since. Several interviewees indicated that soaring inflation since the devaluation has 
kept them in poverty because their salaries have not risen as quickly. According to 
CEPAL, inflation in Argentina has increased by 54.9% since the devaluation (Anuario 
Estadística 2.3.1.). This factor is especially relevant in keeping the new poor 
impoverished because they generally work in the services sector so tend not to be 
unionised, whereas workers in the manufacturing or construction industry who are, 
have taken advantage of the new dialogue with the Kirchner government to push for 
wage rises at least in line with inflation since September 2003 (Kessler 2007). 
 
Graph 1 (in appendix) illustrates how for the remaining 60% of the new poor who 
have not escaped poverty since the corralito, spending habits and lifestyles remain 
curtailed compared to those who managed to recover. 
                                                
3CCR consultancy groups 2006 survey 
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CHAPTER 2  
LABOUR MARKET & SOCIAL MOBILITY SINCE THE CRISIS 
 
 
Argentina: A History of Intergenerational Upward Social Mobility 
Minujín and Lopez demonstrated that new poverty is closely related to individuals 
fluctuating connection to employment, and therefore poverty is becoming a more fluid 
condition (Feijoo 2003:14). To explain why some newly impoverished have not 
managed to escape pauperisation since the corralito, a detailed look at the labour 
market since then must be conducted. 
 
Throughout the twentieth-century, Argentines enjoyed an exceptionally high degree of 
upward social mobility relative to the rest of Latin America. This upward generational 
mobility began when millions of migrants arrived at the countrys urban centres during 
Perons efforts to build up domestic industry and was facilitated by an unusually 
accessible education system (Mafud 1985:24-26). Traditionally, it has been assumed 
that a movement from employment in the primary to the secondary or from secondary 
to the tertiary sectors represents upward occupational mobility because usually it is 
synonymous with higher salaries, improved working conditions, prestige or autonomy. 
Between 1965 and 1995 for example, this upward mobility occurred because structural 
changes in the economy, strongly created jobs in the services sector whilst jobs were 
shed in industry and extraction (FONDECYT survey, Buenos Aires, Kessler/Espinoza 
2006). In terms of the highest positioned job that one would obtain in their life, if the 
subject today is middle-aged, the biggest movements in upward occupational mobility 
Our children are the first generation to be worse off than their parents
           Daniel Filmus, Argentine Minister for Education 
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in Argentina were experienced between their grandparent (usually of the immigrant 
generation) and their parent, with often further (but reduced) upward mobility between 
their parent and themselves. However their children (today under thirty years old) are 
beginning to experience zero or even downward mobility (Triskier 2007).  
 
Explaining the above formula, Total occupational mobility equals Structural mobility 
(changes in mobility attributable to transformations in the economy which effect 
demand for labour in different sectors) plus Residual mobility (the extent to which 
individuals work themselves up the ladder, exploiting opportunities available to them 
such as education, natural ability and their own efforts). The interesting thing is that the 
proportion of total occupational mobility consisting of residual mobility has been 
falling since the 1960s. It made up approximately 53.2% of the total (compared to 
46.8% attributable to structural changes) in 1960, whereas by the year 2000, it had 
declined to just 41.6% of the total (Kessler/Espinoza 2006). The results of this survey 
are critical for the new poor because they mean that although the social structure in 
Argentina is still permeable, it is becoming increasingly rigid. Individuals are evermore 
reliant on the demand for labour in the economy rather than their own individual 
accomplishments in order to achieve upward mobility. However, for the new poor it 
means that it is increasingly difficult to become upwardly mobile after a fall such as 
the one they experienced.  
 
Total Occupational Mobility = Structural Mobility + Residual Mobility 
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Downward Social Mobility and the New Poor since the Crisis 
 
This trend is not necessarily a bad thing, so long as the structural changes in the 
economy promote upward mobility. Indeed, the epoch of neo-liberalism has intensified 
upward structural mobility because on the whole it has created greater numbers of 
highly-skilled and professional jobs in services, commerce, business, and professions, 
whilst rapidly replacing employment in agriculture, construction and manufacturing (as 
the result of privatisations or the increasing substitution of labour with capital in these 
sectors ibid. 2006). However, one of the legacies of the 2001 economic crisis has been 
that for the first time in modern Argentine history, the labour market has actually been 
haemorrhaging hundreds of thousands of skilled service sector jobs and creating almost 
as many in industry and construction. Primary and secondary sectors have been the 
backbone of the subsequent Argentine boom (the economy is averaging 8% per year 
growth) due to high world commodity prices and soaring demand for manufactured 
exports following the post-crisis peso devaluation (Beccaria 2005:239). CEPAL figures 
in Table 1 (see appendix) convey how since 2002, the Argentine economy has 
experienced labour market transformations that signify downward structural mobility. 
For those who have remained newly impoverished in 2007, especially those who lost 
jobs or were demoted during the crisis, at best they have experienced stagnated 
mobility or have gained lower-level jobs in the same field as their previous job, but 
have potentially suffered occupational movements away from highly-qualified service 
sector employment towards unskilled, manual jobs in industry or extraction. For the 
new poor, who have not yet recovered their old occupational status, there is little hope 
of achieving upward mobility and doing so in future (Kessler/Espinoza 2006).  
 
Traditional service class jobs that nuevos pobres would have habitually commanded 
have dried up or only have only begun to recover since the heavy losses sustained 
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during the crisis. In terms of who is actually filling job vacancies since the corralito, 
another piece of evidence makes for fascinating reading. If one examines these figures in 
terms of level of education as a basis for comparison, it indicates that those with completed 
secondary or tertiary education (where the new poor are generally located) are getting back 
to work far more quickly (21% and 16% employment growth respectively) than those with 
incomplete secondary or completed primary education (just 3% growth) between 2002 and 
2005 (Beccaria 2005:243). Yet, although the higher-qualified benefited most from job 
creation during the economic recovery, they have gained proportionately least in terms of 
salary recovery. Between October 2001 and 2005, real income for those with lower levels 
of education fell by 30.5% whereas for those with secondary or tertiary education it 
diminished by 40%. Since the recovery (October 2002), average salary growth in the first 
two years was 8.1% across sectors; yet in services class sectors such as business, real 
estate, and finance - where new poor are most likely to be found, it actually fell by 8%. 
Meanwhile salaries soared 16% in industry and construction (ibid.2005:244-246, SITEAL).  
 
Generally, one has witnessed a displacement of lowly-skilled, structurally poor workers in 
the unskilled services sector by the new poor, who have taken over their jobs having not 
been able to find the qualified jobs they would be more suited to (Kessler/Di Virgilio 
2006). Employers tend to prefer having higher-qualified people doing the same jobs for the 
same wage. Thus, many new poor are finding that work is fairly easy to obtain, so long as 
it is lowly-skilled and often poorly paid. As several interviewees commented, employers 
are taking advantage of the desperate need to have work and are remunerating them 
pitifully. A professional English translator who had well-paid jobs with several 
multinational organisations during the 1990s recounts: 
After working for several weeks through the night in a call-centre, I decided to look for a 
new job because I was completely exhausted. Since then, Ive been working as a sales 
assistant in a shop, selling leather goods. I use my English to converse with tourist 
customers and my boss offers me a double shift, which I do every day, six days per week 
from 9am to 8.30pm. The long hours are hard, I have to stand up all day, which makes my 
legs ache, but I have no choice. If I didnt Id be completely in debt.  
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Even for those who have managed to retain their qualified and apparently prestigious 
jobs, many have remained poor. This is due to the phenomenon of spurious upward 
mobility in which despite maintaining upward occupational mobility, it has been 
accompanied by downward mobility in terms of pay and conditions. Although this 
was also occurring throughout the 1990s, the tendency has been aggravated by the 
economic crisis as the weight on employers to create a flexible workforce has become 
more intense. Work has become more precarious, and downward pressure on salaries 
means that those jobs created for the services class are much more poorly paid than 
several years ago (ibid. 2006). In 2001 for example, a skilled and qualified worker in 
the services sector earned some 30% less (in real terms) than an unskilled, manual 
worker in 1980.  
 
Since the crisis, many companies are much more wary of the difficulties fixed contracts 
can cause during periods of economic downturn. For that reason, it is increasingly 
common today to take on unemployed professionals as self-employed consultants 
whose jobs are dependent on the success or failure of the company who hire them 
(Postel 2007). The numbers of highly-educated in non-contracted work have surged 
by 6% for men and 14% for women (SITEAL 2.7/2.8) while between 2000 and 2005, 
the proportion of well-educated people in informal sector work rose by about 3% (this 
is also higher for women). Average informal sector salaries are approximately half that 
of the formal sector and virtually all informal sector workers are living below the 
poverty-line, including a significant part of the new poor (Oña 2007).  
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Barriers to Recovery for the New Poor in Argentinas Labour Market 
Nuevos Pobres who possessed wide-ranging experience before 2001 have found it 
much easier to find work again than those with limited experience, among who 
unemployment, underemployment and unskilled, low-salaried work are more common 
today (Postel 2007). Interviews reveal that sometimes this is because the individuals 
themselves find it unfeasible to retrain in another skill, because they do not have the 
money to take a course and certainly cannot forego all or part of their salary to do so. 
Furthermore, although first degrees (except postgraduate) are free, no government 
assistance is available in the form of grants. Businesspeople and industrialists are often 
the ones who have remained impoverished because the crisis left them with large debts 
from their companies. Also they commonly employed family members in their (now 
bankrupt) businesses, which created multiple negative impacts on the household 
economy when they closed. Apart from the fact that the debt burden is one that those in 
the independent professions (those not reliant upon demand) did not have, 
dependent professionals tended to have skills in just one specific area that was subject 
to consumer demand, which has since vanished by 2007. Meanwhile, those in the 
independent professions such as teachers and doctors were more shielded from the 
impact of the crisis: 
When our factory went bankrupt in 2002, luckily I had experience in other areas. For many 
years I was a biology teacher. So I said to myself Im going to start teaching again and you 
know what? Within weeks I was giving classeshowever the opposite happened to her [his 
wife]. You see she didnt have the same diversity of experience as me. Losing the factory 
really got her down. Shes lost the get up and go (onda) she used to have and today she still 
hasnt found anything. 
 
Some of this group of former industrialists managed to undertake a short-term vocation 
as a coping strategy before recommencing production as the economy picked up. But 
for those who have not had such luck and couldnt afford to purchase the equipment or 
rent the property to do so, their economic woes continue. For others without experience 
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in diverse areas, obtaining employment lower down the hierarchy in the same industry 
was usually the only option. Yet sometimes, in such cases, employers wouldnt take 
them seriously. In others they are too ashamed to take on a job they are over-qualified 
for:  
I was very well known in the world of fashion. All my ex-employees merely had to mention 
that they had worked for Silvia W. and they would immediately be offered jobs because I had 
a reputation for getting the best out of my staff. But curiously when Silvia W. came to look 
for work, the door was closed every time. Its been so hard because Ill ask old contacts in the 
industry if they have any vacancies selling clothes in their shops and theyll answer but what 
with all your experience, why would you want to do that?! If only they knew, Id do 
anything to work again. 
 
Additional problems exist that are peculiar to the new poor, in terms of their pursuit of 
work, which have made the chances of achieving employment more limited since the 
corralito. It is important to realise that the ways in which educated people affected by 
economic crises look for work is totally opposite to the strategies adopted by 
businesses to recruit. Being more likely to purchase newspapers, those with higher 
levels of education will first browse the appointments section of the papers to look for 
job opportunities. Then they may approach an employment agency, but the very last 
option they will explore, is to resort to social networks because of the shame in 
revealing their plummeting personal circumstances to friends and acquaintances 
(Goldschmidt 2007). Social contacts (not newspapers, or employment centres) are also 
the way that 83% of people achieve employment (Bolles 2006), so effectively the 
social capital, which should be a strength for the middle sectors, is a superfluous 
resource for the new poor. In contrast, company mangers will first search within their 
own ranks and networks and only as a very last resort will they place an advert in a 
newspaper to recruit (Goldschmidt 2007). Looking in opposite directions in this way 
has meant that many opportunities to improve their situations have simply passed the 
new poor by. 
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Age discrimination by employers is a principal cause of ongoing impoverishment for 
those who suffered in the economic crisis. A visit to several job centres in Buenos 
Aires divulged that perhaps 80% of jobs advertised, specifically requested that 
applicants be under the age of forty-five. Equality laws to prevent such practices do not 
exist. But there are other more tolerable reasons why older people are experiencing 
such difficulties in the labour market. To a certain extent, those who are middle-aged 
are more likely to possess traditional qualifications that are no longer relevant or 
demanded in the modern labour market. Those qualified in new professions like 
technicians, computer analysts and engineers have been inclined to recover their old 
jobs much more quickly than geologists for example (Kessler 2007). As I was told by 
someone in her fifties: 
 
If I could go back in time I would choose a much more practical degree, because nowadays they 
ask for practical experience and specific qualifications when recruiting. No one wants to take on 
someone like me as a secretary with my Arts degree. They prefer someone who has just 
graduated as a bilingual secretary. 
 
 
Gorz and Dahrendorf contemplated that we are in the era of the end of work. Nun 
clarified that what is really at play is the end of the notion of salaried, stable and well 
remunerated employment as a pillar of social cohesion (Iriarte 2003). Efforts by the 
Government to address these key issues in the labour market have failed. There appear 
to be few options of escape for the new poor as things stand in 2007. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CRISIS, SELF-IDENTITY, PSYCHE & NEW REALITY 
Saber que se puede querer que se pueda, 
quitarse los miedos sacarlos afuera; 
pintarse la cara color esperanza, 
tentar al futuro con el corazón 
 
       Diego Torres, 2002 
 
Convertibility, End of the Middle-Class Dream & Coping Strategies 
 
The words of Color Esperanza struck a chord with every Argentine who had been 
affected by the economic crisis. The lyrics imparted an upbeat message of hope to 
those who had lost everything and who were struggling to resurrect their lives. 
Needless to say, the song got to number one. And it stayed there. Amidst the 
desperation and terror felt by the middle-class at the time (Masseroni/Suane 
2004:247-257), the success of Torres song represented the sparks of optimism that 
were yearned for. This chapter investigates how the social attitudes, self-perception and 
psychological state of the newly impoverished have evolved since.  
 
In the years that followed Menems pinning the peso to the dollar in 1991 (so as to 
confront inflation and allay middle-class fears about their own implosion), this magic 
formula allowed the middle sectors to finally fulfil their dream of entering the first 
world: For several years, they basked in an orgy of conspicuous consumption due to the 
artificially low prices for luxury imports and overseas holidays (Guano 2004:76) but 
when this policy became unsustainable during the economic crisis, the peso devalued 
by some 300% and their quality of life plummeted overnight. Having lived so 
extravagantly, they subsequently had to fundamentally readapt their lifestyles by 
enacting coping strategies to allow them to survive from day to day. The erosion of the 
very cultural practices and values that distinguished them from the structural poor 
began to penetrate the middle sectors from the late 1970s but became much more acute 
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after the corralito as convertibiliad ended. Shivering from the cold during an interview 
that took place in the home of one respondent while it snowed outside, I was told: 
I look back on the time when the peso was one-to-one with the dollar with fond memories. 
I earned 2,000 dollars a month; I could go to the supermarket and buy what I wanted 
without even looking at the prices. Now I dont even have enough to pay the electricity bill 
and I havent bought clothes for five years. Its dangerous because ten years ago we could 
buy anything we wanted... We arent accustomed to living this way... and my telephone 
line is controlled. It hurts because I cant even call my daughter who left three years ago to 
find work overseas.  
 
In 2003, the World Bank (153) identified the implementation of several adaptive 
household strategies by the new poor, which reduced consumption. Among those that 
have since become long-term include the restricted use of utilities, public transport and 
taxis (especially following the energy crisis of 2007 which led to price hikes). The 
elderly have been especially affected by this and the fact that some imported medicines 
became prohibitively expensive since the peso devaluation. Most new poor have 
maintained some private health coverage (obra social) although at reduced levels. 
These trends have severely diminished human and physical capital since the crisis.  
 
Some active strategies have also become more permanent like the tendency for 
increased numbers of income earners in the household. However, selling off assets, 
supplementing income through micro-businesses and resorting to social network 
strategies like receiving aid from NGOs have become less commonplace since 2003. 
Participation in the exciting barter clubs, (clubs de trueque) which temporarily helped 
replenish social capital, has also dwindled to negligible levels, as many have since 
gained full-time (albeit low-paid) employment, denying the need to engage in trueque 
(Bombal/Luzzi in Epstein 2006:149-153).  
 
Feijoo explains that when minimalist strategies such as cutting back consumption 
reached the point where acute downheartedness and feelings that there was no way 
out of the economic situation became overbearing, the new poor began to dream of 
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returning to the prosperous European lands from which their grandparents came, or of 
escaping even further afield to north America or Israel (2003:46). Although it is 
difficult to know how many out of the 250,000 Argentines who emigrated since the 
economic crisis did so because they were newly impoverished, it is fair to say that it 
was a sizable proportion, having scraped the resources together to do so. In 2002 Abadi 
and Mileo forecast that many of the new poor who left, had deluded themselves into 
believing that moving overseas could magically solve their economic woes, and that 
they would soon become disillusioned with their new lives (2002:137-143). By 2004, 
this vision had been fulfilled and the vast majority who left Argentina had returned 
home. During the last three years, also spurred by the Argentine recovery, they 
continue to return in large numbers (Galván 2007).  
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Coping with Coping Strategies  Psycological Impact of the Crisis 
Many new poor have had their ideas, beliefs and expectations fundamentally reshaped 
by their new reality, (Kessler/Di Virgilio 2006) but unlike the north American new 
poor from the last three decades, who could look to the Great Depression, families in 
Argentina had no similar experiences as points of reference to draw upon to help them 
cope psychologically with sudden impoverishment (Shutz 1987 in ibid.).  
 
According to sociologist Ana Wortman, in an attempt to maintain certain symbolic 
social or cultural capital after the crisis, many new poor tried to continue attending 
sports clubs, send their children to private school, or maintain internet access as a form 
of social contact to demonstrate ostentatiously to others that they still possessed 
economic means, even if it meant foregoing health insurance or getting into further 
debt (Elustono 2006). This has been impossible to maintain in the long-term, but 
various, innovative ways of obscuring the shameful signs of having socially 
descended into impoverishment are constantly devised (Valente 2007). Many have 
refused to relinquish certain, small indulgences that provide minimal pleasures to look 
forward to amidst a sea of despair (Golovanevsky 2004:153).  
 
Mafud (1985:86-91) explains that certain social norms associated with middle-class 
lifestyles makes them particularly exposed to feelings which induce psychological 
trauma in times of economic crisis. Freud describes how if the superego (the self-
constructed image of how one should be if they reach their potential) is not achieved, it 
can generate frustration (Masseroni/Suane 2004:244). The middle-class has thus been 
especially vulnerable because they are imbued with high aspirations and were 
disproportionately affected by the crisis and social decline. Consequently, self-esteem 
has been severely crushed, which has itself produced a vicious circle of poverty 
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because it has often resulted in the new poor not believing in themselves or their ability 
to find work again.  
 
From infancy, a guiding precept is individual competitiveness with others and self-
reliance, characteristics that affect all elements of their social and human relations. A 
profound fear of being unmasked for their frailties dominates life and creates a 
distortion between the outward appearance they present to others and their reality. It is 
not surprising then, that the economic crisis led to feelings of extreme isolation and 
loneliness, and that they could not reveal to the outside world what was happening to 
them. As one respondent expressed when describing what was most important when 
receiving aid from an NGO:  
Yes they helped me, the really helped me, especially by putting me in touch with people 
who were going through the same thing as me. I mean when you meet such people you 
finally realise that you arent alone. This was more important than giving me money to buy 
food because it provided reassurance. You cant put a price on that.  
 
For reasons of pride, many new poor neither sought nor accepted aid from NGOs and 
charities, in some cases despite destitution (Triskier 2007). Those who did (especially 
the elderly) today find themselves exposed to increased vulnerability because with 
scarce financial capital or useful human capital remaining, they rely on such social 
networks for survival (Minujín/Anguita 2004:39). 
 
Stability is another value in which the middle-class is conditioned. The expectation of 
high educational attainment and the purchase of property are typical insurance polices 
they strive for (Mafud 1985:101). The economic chaos of 2000-2002 and ensuing 
personal vulnerability has left them floundering.  
 
In contrast to numerous working-class manifestations of solidarity to try to regain 
upward mobility since the crisis, with no shared burden or sense of struggle (other than 
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the cacerolazos or asambleas that are now virtually defunct) feelings of impotence 
have set in. If traumatic experiences as well as the idea they will never return to the 
quality of life they once had, are prolonged (as has been the case for the new poor who 
have not recovered), it breeds feelings of despair, depression or mental paralysis (ibid). 
 
Interviews were particularly revealing about how different people have responded to 
prolonged impoverishment in contrasting ways. Two harmful defence mechanisms 
have been enacted in response to sudden impoverishment - denial and guilt. For those 
who had managed to accept their new realities, there was more pessimism but self-
culpability about their situations. One respondent blamed herself and other Argentines 
for the mistake of buying cheap imported goods during convertibilidad in the 1990s 
thus, contributing to the countrys increasing debt! 
 
 
Interestingly from both my own interviews and those by Masseroni and Sauane in 
2002-3, women tended to fall more into this category. Males were more likely to be in 
denial of their current realities, hence expressed more optimistic outlooks. The gender 
difference in postures may partly be attributable to ongoing machismo in Argentine 
society and roles expected of men and women. The woman is more frequently the one 
who has to confront the daily realities of the household economy.  
 
Then of course as already discussed, among the nuevos pobres themselves the scope of 
experiences among them translate into varied psychological responses. Those who 
were slowly impoverished during the 1990s and for whom the economic crisis was the 
final blow have managed to adjust more easily and with relatively limited 
psychological damage because the last decade has been one of gradual sacrifice of 
cultural capital that has moulded a new way of life. However, for those who suddenly 
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lost everything in the crisis, the shock of having to abruptly adapt to their new reality 
has induced far more serious repercussions (Triskier 2007). 
 
Psychologically, the single most significant blow for the new poor has been the loss or 
downgrading of their employment status. Among the services class, a persons very 
identity is strongly defined by their work. The shame that this has engendered among 
the new poor has, in many cases since 2001, provoked self-exclusion and withdrawal 
from social circles, not only because they feel uncomfortable in such environments but 
also because they simply dont have the money to maintain the expensive lifestyles 
associated with socialising with old acquaintances. In the absence of their previous 
occupation, they feel they are not valued (Goldschmidt 2007) and increasingly 
disconnected from society. This detachment, exacerbated since the corralito, has not 
only resulted in the loss of social capital but has also caused problems with 
reintegration and marginalisation that will no doubt be a legacy of nueva pobreza.  
 
Inevitably, increased vulnerability caused by economic instability, constant mental 
anxiety, working demands and qualitative and quantitative reduction in leisure time, 
especially since the crisis, has provoked huge increases in stress-related health 
problems in many nuevos pobres according to figures from the Alvear Hospital in 
Buenos Aires in 2007.  
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Social Attitudes - Impact of the Crisis 
Torrado explains that since the nuevos pobres have lost one of their most valuable 
privileges  upward social mobility, their life projects have evaporated. Feijoo disagrees 
and argues that because they still possess higher educational standards than the structural 
poor, they conserve their aspirations in spite of their economic situation (Ansaldi 2003). In 
reality, the impact is different from case to case and much depends on the distinction 
mentioned earlier between those who have accepted their new reality and those who deny 
it. Generally since 2001, all ambition and hope has dissipated. The crisis of 2001 taught the 
middle sectors that even when the country appears stable (as it did in the mid-1990s when 
the peso was tied to the dollar); a new crisis might be imminent. Increasingly only short-
term preoccupations exist (Figueira in Elustono 2006) and expectations have been 
minimised, perhaps as a defence mechanism to avoid disappointment. One woman 
commented: 
My goals nowadays are modestthe zenith (cumbre) of my life has pastthinking 
realistically about what I want from my life now; Id have to say just to maintain what I 
already have. What has happened to me has killed off any hopes (mató la illusion) of 
anything more. If I lost a little money because the business wasnt running well or in some 
crisis or other, I used to say well never mind, the wheel will keep spinning. But its when 
the wheel doesnt turn anymore that you have a problem.  
 
With respect to attitudes towards their childrens education, Daniel Filmus the Argentine 
Minister for Education recently conceded that in Argentina, education can no longer be 
seen as a trampoline towards social mobility, today it is more of a parachute (Minujín 
2004:129). Young adult new poor seem to increasingly be concentrating on living for the 
day. Their lack of hope is acting as a deterrent to planning for their futures. For example, 
according to Alberto Croce, Director of the SES Foundation,4 before, university students 
would choose degrees that would send them into a specific career because they could plot a 
way into the labour market. Since the crisis, this optimism has disappeared and they are 
increasingly choosing degrees that they enjoy doing instead (Minujín/Anguita 2004:130). 
Between 1999 and 2004 the numbers of university students at the UBA who enrolled in the 
                                                
4 A Foundation in Argentina that works to promote educational inclusion for young people 
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social sciences increased by 51.6% and the numbers studying Philosophy and Arts climbed 
by 33.8% (Carli 2007 8-11). Yet these fields are among those with the lowest prospects of 
employment upon leaving university according to Sergio Postel, Director of the Fundación 
Ariel5 (2007). For reasons mentioned in Chapter 2, today a university degree neither 
guarantees the kind of employment the graduate desires nor a higher salary  which is 
contributing towards a second generation of highly-qualified new poor. Despite this, 
generally the young new poor feel its still worth enrolling for any degree so that they 
will at least have a better chance of securing employment one day, even if it ends up being 
low-skilled work.  
 
This is especially true for females who are attending university in increasing numbers 
relative to males from new poor families since the crisis. There is now almost a 7:3 female 
to male ratio (UNESCO). This is partly explained due to the ongoing wage discrimination 
against women in the labour market that means men earn approximately 45% more for 
performing the same job. Male 18 year-olds are weighing up the costs and benefits of 
forfeiting six years salary and are in greater numbers, deciding that a university degree is 
simply not worthwhile so are preparing to enter the job market straight after leaving 
school. This is because their salary will be comparably higher, and also because they know 
they will find it more difficult to obtain part-time work to pay for their studies than their 
female peers. Female school leavers (or their parents) recognise the need to be more 
qualified than men in the long-term to earn the same salary (Goldschmidt 2007). 
 
At least at primary and secondary levels, newly impoverished parents are trying to preserve 
educational standards for their children and there has been no large-scale abandonment of it 
since the corralito (Minujín 2004:129). Between 2000 and 2007 many more medium to 
well-educated parents are sending their children to school a year earlier than the 
                                                
5 An Argentine employment service, specifically established to support professionals and new poor since 
the economic crisis www.jobariel.net 
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compulsory starting age of six. However, it wasnt until 2003-4 that there was a sharp 
increase in the numbers of 15-17 year olds from such households who dropped out of 
school altogether to seek full-time employment in order to supplement household income 
(SITEAL). This suggests that during the initial aftermath of the crisis, parents placed 
greater emphasis on the importance of education and advised their children to stay at 
school or university, but when they realised they could not raise sufficient income on their 
own a year or two later, they reluctantly demanded that their children initiated their careers. 
The personal sacrifices many have made in order to keep their children in private schools 
are admirable (although this endeavour has not always been sustainable). The parents of 
todays school or university-aged children are either the children or the grandchildren of 
the immigrant generation themselves. It appears that the cherished value which that 
generation placed upon education (because it was the only route open to them for social 
ascendancy in a Creole society where the upper-class monopolised senior positions) has 
persisted, even though the likelihood that educational achievement will actually help them 
- has reduced since (Mafud 1985:17). 
 
However in what Minujín labels the dis-education of the new poor, certain elements of 
informal education are certainly being diminished in such families. The sales of books are 
plummeting and parents read to their children less as working hours have risen since the 
crisis (Minujín/Anguita 2004:129). He also observes how adolescents from such families 
are increasingly attending state schools rather than private ones, and suffering 
detrimentally in educational terms from lower spending on (and standards in) state schools 
generally. 
 
Regardless of educational enrolment and attendance, the children of nuevos pobres have 
much less chance of acquiring the cultural capital that their parents did. It is estimated that 
to enjoy the equivalent educational, recreational and cultural standards just for one 
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middle-class child of 15-20 years it would require parents to part with an extra 1,500-
2,000 pesos (£250-£350) per month. This equates to about half the average household 
income for an Argentine family! (2004:20). 
 
As the prospect of social mobility has disappeared during recent years, superstition and 
spirituality have emerged as alternative sources of hope, as has gambling, replacing the 
void that hard-work, education and upward structural mobility left behind. One architect I 
spoke to who has only achieved sporadic and poorly paid employment since the time of the 
corralito told me: 
After everything Ive been through in the last few years, on the one hand I despair but on the 
other Im willing to believe in anything. Thats why, although you may find it strange, I wear 
this lucky bracelet. 
 
An investigation for Clarín newspaper revealed that during the last fifteen years, (but with 
increasing ferocity since the economic crisis), a rapidly growing number of the 
impoverished middle-class are being seduced by evangelical, religious sects who claim to 
have quick-fix solutions to their problems (Elustono 2006). 
 
Politically speaking, certainly at the height of the asambleas barriales between 2002 and 
2003, participation in protests and alternative forms of government as well as solidarity 
with social movements by the new poor was strong (World Bank 2003:17). This attitude 
temporarily replaced the save yourself, if you can mentality that the Menem period 
engendered during the 1990s (Dinerstein 2003:190). However, such mind-sets have since 
faded away as resignation took root, and people concentrated on rebuilding their lives at 
more practical levels. The period of political crisis and engagement with alternatives 
heightened political awareness for many, but in the longer-term, has merely contributed to 
cynicism and disillusionment with mainstream politicians. Little faith remains that the 
traditional political process will be able to resolve their economic woes although radical 
solutions have escaped them (Briones/Mendoza 2003:13). 
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Social and Household Relations  Impact of the Crisis 
Pauperisation has had detrimental affects upon social relations, and significantly 
reduced social capital for the victims of nueva pobreza. In terms of household 
composition, the 2003 World Bank household survey found that recently impoverished 
Argentines (especially those hit by unemployment) had returned to their original family 
homes to live with nuclear or even extended family, in order to save rent (17). In some 
cases this emergency arrangement persists, which proves problematic because it has 
pushed many households back into an expansionary phase of the household cycle and 
higher dependency ratios.  
 
But the traditional family model also broke down in other ways. The upheaval caused 
by the economic crisis obliged both the spouses of the main (usually male) breadwinner 
in the household, as well as children of working age, to try to earn an income. The 
household therefore experienced a redefinition of roles and duties. Often during 2001/2 
it even entailed the female becoming head of the household because the types of jobs 
available at the time tended to suit (and request) women, including many that were 
temporary or in the informal sector (ibid.18). Ever since, low real terms salary levels 
have obliged many new poor women who were new to the workforce, to retain their 
jobs, even after their husbands returned to full-time employment. Invariably, this has 
increased womens burdens, and they are now expected not only to fulfil domestic 
responsibilities but earn additional income (Masseroni/Sauane 2004:259). Factors such 
as the anxiety caused by economic and occupational instability and longer working 
hours (thus less quality time spent between family members) have combined to 
increase the strains upon all types of relationships. This has triggered higher divorce 
rates, acts of aggression as well as drug and alcohol consumption among struggling 
middle sectors (World Bank 2003:18).  
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Latin America witnessed strong rises in the number of female-headed households 
within the middle-class during the 1990s, as a result of higher divorce rates. As it was 
women who were usually left to rear any children, it has led to what Jelin describes as 
the feminisation of poverty. Such households remain particularly vulnerable because 
not only is their sole income distributed more sparsely across dependents, but also 
women are still subject to lower salaries for performing the same job. They also have 
less access to credit, so opportunities to escape recent impoverishment are impeded 
(1998:99-100). Domestic violence in newly impoverished families that have remained 
together has also risen since 2001 (Kliksberg 2006). 
 
Generally speaking, old friendships appear to have died away and social capital has 
been used up without being regenerated (Kessler/Di Virgilio 2006). One single mother I 
spoke to, recounted what happened in a relationship with her partner:  
My last partner was two years ago  Miguel. We went out for four months And the 
excuse he gave me when he left was that he could see that I was struggling due to my 
financial situation and told me he didnt want to be with someone so embittered by it. 
 
But in some cases pauperisation has strengthened marital partnerships or friendships 
The most upsetting part about it all was what happened to us socially. When all this 
happened to us, our friends suddenly disappearedthey wouldnt even greet us in the street 
anymoreits like if you dont have any money you are nobody. But the important thing is 
that it made my own relationship with my wife much stronger. It was strengthened in many 
ways  mutual support, someone to listen to your grief. After having lost so many friends I 
looked around me and saw the one person left who was always going to be by my side. 
 
In several homes that I returned to since 2003, it was noticeable that having lost many 
friends, family gatherings had significantly increased in importance.  
 
One interviewee distressingly conveyed how new poverty can obstruct childbearing. 
Whereas among the structural poor, having more children is seen as an investment to 
generate extra household income in future years, for the new poor, different, middle-
class values predominate and poverty means they either dont feel it is fair to raise a 
child in such circumstances or need to concentrate on re-establishing their careers. 
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Self-Perception  Impact of the Crisis 
The experience of pauperisation and the decay of cultural norms have painfully brought 
the self-identity of the new poor into question during the last few years (Golovanevsky 
2004:157). The shattering realisation that now their income levels and social position 
are similar to those of the traditional poor, even the ones who live in shantytowns, has 
led them to recognise that the only thing distinguishing them is their superior education 
and distinct personal histories (Lvovich in Svampa 2000:78). In response, some new 
poor have conjured up imaginative ways of differentiating themselves. Obviously, one 
should not generalise and many find such views repugnant, but elements of the fallen 
middle-class of European extraction have attempted to reinforce their fading social 
differences with the structural poor, by evoking the imagery composed by Sarmiento 
and the founding fathers of Argentina, which promoted the whitening of its city 
centres. Thus, they have begun to demonise shantytown inhabitants on the urban 
periphery and dehumanise minority groups in city-centres as barbaric, dangerous and 
foreign (Guano 2004:69). While conducting my fieldwork in Buenos Aires, 
conservative business tycoon Mauricio Macri, won a landslide victory for the 
governorship of Capital Federal, largely playing on peoples fears about crime. Part of 
his manifesto was to eradicate the shantytowns  the alleged source of criminality. 
However, in more than one home affected by nueva pobreza, I was told that this was no 
solution because the villeros would merely seek new accommodation by encroaching 
on city-centre areas, taking possession of its abandoned houses and bringing with them 
associated crime and other ills. The subtext seemed to be their fear that the last 
recognisable barrier between themselves and the traditional poor - sites of residence, 
would disintegrate. Such trepidation is not totally unfounded. Record numbers of 
villeros are currently occupying vacant housing in the city-centres, diluting hitherto 
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existing spatial segregation between new and structural poor (Kessler/Di Virgilio 
2006). 
 
The new poor are also finding it almost impossible to define their own social position. 
Aspiration and upward social mobility were principles by which one could once 
identify the middle-class. However, in an era where these concepts have been lost or 
made obsolete respectively, it is problematic to continue to do so. Torrado adds that 
given there are now so many incoherent features of it such as precarious formal 
employment, unemployed university graduates or homeowners on state benefits and 
who cant even meet basic needs, being middle-class increasingly only exists in the 
imaginary (Elustono 2006). Many are inventing reasons for their own inclusion  
qualifications (even if they are low), past employment and cultural standards. Among 
newly impoverished, three trends have emerged in terms of self-definition according to 
a CCR study. The first group continues to describe themselves as middle-class, based 
on the above principles but admit they have been impoverished. They make up 55%. 
A second group, 33% of the sample, speak of themselves as middle-class but explain 
that although they have sustained heavy falls in their standards of living, their affiliation 
to the middle-class is not compromised because there has been a massive devaluation 
of the term. A third group representing 12%, consider themselves expelled from it, 
citing deterioration in lifestyles and consumption patterns. This group is growing fastest 
of all, and those who did not possess such a high level of education held these views 
especially strongly. Whilst recognising their own impoverishment and closeness to the 
lower-class, they maintain a distance from them, for example by refusing to be part of 
assistentialist aid programmes, insisting they are only for the really poor (Kessler/Di 
Virgilio 2006). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1) What Happened to the New Poor & What Does their Future Hold? 
 
Marx prophetic words are like a spectre haunting twenty-first century Argentina. In 
terms of their asset capitals, they have not only remained impoverished financially, but 
their human capital has also rapidly eroded for the reasons outlined. With respect to 
their social capital, networks have been exhausted and connectednesses forsaken as 
relationships have generally suffered. Physical capital has also reduced, as access to 
private services has declined. Evidence in this paper suggests that the first generation 
of nuevos pobres (elderly and middle-aged), who derive from any of the three waves of 
pauperisation and have not escaped impoverishment since the corralito, are unlikely to 
do so in future given the crucial role that the labour market has played in keeping the 
new poor impoverished and evidence that upward social mobility, even upward 
structural mobility has ended (and is in fact turning downward). In effect, for the first 
generation of nuevos pobres, in terms of their financial, social, physical and human 
asset capitals, they have indeed moved much closer to the structural poor as illustrated 
by Diagram 3 (in appendix). Generally, they have not quite sunk into structural poverty 
because elements of their human capital (education and skills) remain, even if less 
valuable or relevant than before. By nature of their type and location of residence, their 
physical capital remains marginally higher too. 
 
The lower strata of the middle class - the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired 
tradesmen generallyall these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because they 
are swamped by competition with the large capitalists and partly because their 
specialised skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production.  
 
    Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto, 1848  
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Interestingly, many respondents felt much more optimistic about their childrens future 
than their own. Parents have generally maintained educational investment in their 
children, perhaps because it is increasingly the only factor separating them from 
structural poverty.  
 
The fact that their parents went to university continues to be an incentive for their 
children to also enrol, and has become a resilient intergenerational cultural feature 
(Kessler, 2007). This suggests that for the second generation (current school pupils, 
university students or those not yet born in new poor families), human capital will 
eventually be replenished. Further, many of the qualifications they receive are much 
more relevant to todays labour market than that of their parents, and they will be likely 
to use this recuperation of human capital to foster their own social and physical capitals 
as well as earnings and liquid asset potential (thus financial capital) in the future. 
However, these capitals probably wont expand to the same point that their parents 
enjoyed at the height of their own careers (in light of the end of upward generational 
mobility and real salary declines). A word of caution here, this prediction is very much 
speculative and generalised. Of course, for those newly impoverished children who 
have abandoned their studies (initially a temporary strategy that has become 
permanent), the human capital deficit will be impossible to reconcile (Kessler/Di 
Virgilio 2006).  
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2) Can We Still Speak of a New Poor? 
Although used in this paper for reasons of simplicity, the antiquated phrase new poor has 
been uncomfortable to employ. Taking their distinct personal histories, satisfied basic 
needs, residential location and elements of cultural capita into account, in its place I 
suggest that the term Post-New Economic Model (PNEM) poverty is adopted to describe 
them herewith. Although this phrase does not easily roll off the tongue, it is apt because it 
encompasses all of those in the generation who were impoverished since the early 1980s 
debt crisis in Latin America because of any of the three phases of the new economic model 
(Bulner-Thomas 1996:1) imposed on the continent to confront the deep structural problems 
that caused it. These phases were 1)1980s stabilisation policies, 2)Early 1990s structural 
adjustment - implemented following the Washington Consensus reforms, and then 
3)Efforts to increase investment and productivity to strengthen the economy in the long-
term. These also correspond chronologically with the three respective waves of new 
poverty in Argentina. A widely accepted view that the excesses of the NEM contributed 
towards the 2001/2 Argentine economic crisis is assumed too, thus those who were 
impoverished since the corralito can also be incorporated into PNEM poverty as they 
were also impoverished because of the NEM. Of course neo-liberalism and the new 
economic model deepened the misery experienced by millions of Argentines who were 
already living in conditions of extreme poverty (Green 2003:85). This term does not imply 
they werent (as it doesnt encompass long-term poor) but refers specifically to those who 
passed from being non-poor into poverty because of the process. Importantly, the term 
therefore also emphasises the historic difference between the two types of poverty as the 
term new poor did. Further, by explicitly linking such impoverishment to an economic 
process (NEM) it invites policy measures to specifically confront its root cause (the 
macroeconomic changes of the last thirty years), instead of encouraging further anti-
poverty measures that treat poverty as a homogenous phenomenon regardless of reasons 
for it - a major government and international institutional failing in recent years. 
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3) Confronting PNEM Poverty  Past Mistakes, Future Lessons 
Although three decades have passed since the emergence of nueva pobreza in 
Argentina, the response from government, international organisms like the World Bank 
and NGOs to address the issue has been abysmally inadequate, most disappointingly 
since the corralito (Kessler 2007).  National governments have been more preoccupied 
devising policy to co-opt the structural poor and pacify the potentially politically 
harmful piquetero movement and trade unions. The relatively new context demands 
especially creative social policy that deviates from those that have traditionally been 
relied upon. Targeted policies based on districts with high incidences of poverty and 
traditional Argentine practices such as political clientelism6 that are used to fire-fight 
structural poverty will not work in the case of PNEM poverty due to its territorially 
dispersed nature and the fact that the old middle sectors are less likely to be bought off 
in this way. Nor will income-targeting work because, as demonstrated, it would be 
impossible to differentiate new and structural poor. 
 
The economic recovery in Argentina since 2001 has been impressive, but its 
governments policy of focussing heavily on stimulating the macro-economy has meant 
the micro-economy has been seriously neglected, especially in the labour market. 
Efforts to reintegrate those affected by PNEM poverty have been feeble. For example, 
one of the few policies enacted that should aid those above the age of forty-five (of 
which there are large numbers of new poor) to return to work - the Regimen Especial 
de Empleo, only applies to Capital Federal and even then does not actually oblige 
companies to obey any specific directive. It merely offers a small incentive (subsidising 
employees salary by 15%) in the instance that firms add older workers to their 
personnel (Asociación 50 a 60). What is really needed are tough and enforceable 
                                                
6 See Auyero (2001) 
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polices that actually outlaw discrimination in the workplace, with greater powers for 
regulatory institutions to monitor and fine companies who for example, pay female 
workers inferior salaries for the same job or favour workers under a certain age. Nor is 
any help offered to mature students affected by PNEM poverty who want to return to 
education and study a degree so as to re-skill for the labour market in 2007. Such 
support could include access to grants or encouraging companies to enact re-training 
leave in a similar way to maternity leave. Forgoing six years salary to undertake a 
degree is simply impossible in the current climate.  
 
To its credit and through the La Red de Regularización de las Relaciones de Trabajo, 
the Kirschner administration has reopened dialogue with the trade unions and 
professionals guilds in recent years, in an effort to regularise the labour market and 
confront the casualisation of work. It has taken steps to encourage formal employment 
and secure pensions, health insurance and other benefits. While this may prevent future 
new poverty for those enjoying formal sector employment, little has been done to 
directly support those who still (out of necessity) work in the informal sector. In order 
to prevent freefall for PNEM poor (or anyone else) who work informally, and to inhibit 
polarisation between them and formal sector workers, as the ILO have suggested, 
measures must be taken to guarantee certain protections for them too.  
 
The main asset of the PNEM poor is their human capital, whether it is superior 
education, leadership skills or experience. Many are unemployed, underemployed or 
employed in areas where their human capital is not utilised. At the same time there is 
an educational crisis, especially in poorer areas where teachers do not have suitable 
qualifications or do not attend classes (Dussel FLACSO 2007). Therefore a National 
Entrepreneur Scheme through which the highly-skilled PNEM poor are targeted and 
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paid by the state to teach English, business management, leadership, accountancy etc to 
these children could resolve such problems. Alternatively they could be employed 
directly by sponsoring firms, who would then benefit from privileged access to 
secondary school leavers in the classes their respective sponsored teachers taught. Such 
policies would help employ new poor and aid their recovery while also improving 
prospects for the young among the structural poor as well as benefiting companies 
themselves.  
 
Due to the fact that so many Argentines have experienced impoverishment during the 
last thirty years, there are and will be growing numbers of elderly PNEM poor - many 
of whose health depends upon imported medicines that are grossly expensive due to the 
weak peso (post-devaluation). A key way of assisting them would be by utilizing the 
profits generated by the current economic boom to create a war chest for use towards 
subsidising medicines further for senior citizens. In the meantime, investment in the 
biotechnology industry must be made so that cheaper, domestically produced 
pharmaceuticals can be manufactured in future. This paper has found that aside from 
the elderly, those who are particularly vulnerable to PNEM poverty and need to be 
supported include women, single parents and those in the expansionary stage of the 
household cycle.   
 
In La Clase Media, Seducida y Abandonada, Minujín and Anguita confidently 
predicted that the nuevos pobres in Argentina will assume an important role in the 
economic recovery of the country, as happened in similar crises in South-East Asia 
after their own crash in the late 1990s, by developing their own small and medium 
sized enterprises (2004:43). However although many PNEM poor, especially those 
industrialists and shop-owners, have the expertise and experience needed to do so, the 
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lack of credit to acquire the resources necessary is a considerable impediment. The 
strengthening of micro-finance initiatives would significantly aid the PNEM poor in 
doing this, because the combination of possessing substantial human capital, the weak 
peso and fertile conditions for industry (especially export promotion) mean they would 
benefit from a strong position to unearth niches and run successful small businesses 
that would help them emerge from poverty.  
 
Finally NGOs such as Fundación Ariel need to be supported and their operations 
expanded. Given the problems indicated earlier concerning the reintegration of new 
poor into the labour market, employment centres that specifically target the 
impoverished services class can help turn their heads of firms and such professionals 
towards, rather than away from each other (Goldschmidt 2007).  
 
Even if these and other polices are implemented, what economists and sociologists 
have long been calling new poverty will almost certainly not be eradicated forever. 
The Argentine economist Miguel Broda once claimed that profound, structural 
conditions that lie in the heart of the Argentine economy condemn the country to a 
perpetual cycle of boom and bust, or as he put it evoking biblical imagery - seven 
years of fat cows then seven years of famine. These conditions are inherent in 
developing capitalist societies and have been aggravated further by the process of neo-
liberalism. Each new recession since the 1980s has brought with it another wave of 
newly impoverished middle sectors, the most recent  the 2001 crisis was more of a 
tsunami that produced millions more. The tide has currently retreated again, but its 
only a matter of time before the next wave comes crashing onto the shore.  
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APPENDIX 
Diagram 1 
 
 
 
Graph 1 
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Asset Pentagons Representing Capitals Trajectory of 
the New Poor Since Corralito 
 
H = Human Capital  N = Natural Capital  F = Financial Capital 
P = Physical Capital  S = Social Capital 
Diagram 2 
 
 
Diagram 3 
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